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ARTICLES 
GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Michael P. Scharff 
INTRonucTroN 
In October 1993, the United States Government announced 
a major policy reversal concerning the establishment of a per-
manent International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Previously, the 
United States had sought to prolong without progressing the 
debate on an ICC. Under the new policy, the United States 
committed itself actively to work toward resolving the remain-
ing legal and practical issues attendant to establishing an ICC. 
From August 1989 to July 1993, I served as the lawyer at 
the U.S. Department of State with responsibility for drafting 
the Government's testimony, speeches, and reports to Congress 
and to the United Nations on the issue of an ICC. Although one 
co=entator has asserted that I was the architect of the Gov-
ernment's position, 1 my role was really more of wordsmith, 
marshalling legal arguments to further policy directives from 
higher level officials at the State Department and the Depart-
ment of Justice. Despite my personal support for the concept of 
an ICC,2 these official statements expressed what Senator Spec-
t Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law; J.D., Duke Uni-
versity School of Law, 1988; Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. 
Department of State, 1989-1993. 
1 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: 
Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 CoLUM:. J. TRANSNAT1L L. 375, 388 
(1992). 
2 See, Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for An Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 1991 Dmm J. CaMP. & lNr'L L. 135 (1991); hereafter ("The 
Jury is Still Out") cited in Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
an International Criminal Court, S. Rep. No. 103-71, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
(1993); Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Feasibility of 
and the Relationship to the Federal Judiciary of an International Criminal Court, 
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te:r has characterized as "cautious skepticism" abont the feasi-
bility and desirabilit-y of establishi.;"!g an ICC.3 
The purpose of Pa..rt I of this article is to shed light (to the 
eJ;::tent possible without violating post-govern_tnent employment 
privileges) on the evolution of the U.S. GoverD..tuents' position 
1-'- on1 one of cautious skepticism to qualified support for the es-
tablishment of an ICC. Pa.t-t II of the a.t-ticle analyzes and sug-
gests :revisions to the proposed statute for an ICC recently 
prepa:ced by the Dl'T International Lavv Commission ("ILC~'). 
The text of the relevant provisions of the d.n;ft statute Are ap-
rl, .J-.,!..1.. , .... ~ - t' ""th'. perr~ca a~.o ~.oEe enu or r;ne syr.nposllli!l sec 10n O.!. -1s Issue. 
I. THE EvoLVING U.S. GoVERNTviENT PosiTION: FRoM 
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM TO QUALL!!lED SUPPORT 
Until quite recently, the U.S. Executive Branch had stead-
fastly maintained the position that it would not support the es-
tablishment of an ICC unless or until all the difficult legal and 
practical problems attendant to such an endeavor had been re-
solved to its complete satisfaction." While the U.S. Govern-
ment's statements ar!.d reports to Congress a.t!d to the United 
October 28, 1991; fu-nerican Bar Association Task Force on An International Crim-
inal Court (1992). 
Prior to the publication of "The Jury is Still Out," the only commentary on the 
issue were advocacy pieces, e:-:pressing uncii.tical support for the creation of such a 
tribunal. See e.g., JuLIUs SToNE & RoBERT K WoETZEL, ToW.A-RD A FEASIBLE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMil'lAL COURT (1970); BEN.TA._'WN B. FERENCZ, P...N INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL CounT: A STEP Tow.&.RD WoRLD PEACE (2 vols. 1980); M. CHERIF BASsroum, A 
DRAFI' INTERNATIONAL CRilVIINAL CODE AND DRA.Fl' STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL 
CRil\UNAL TRIBUNAL (1987); M. CherifBassiouni, The Time lias Come for an Inter-
national Criminal Court, 1 IND. lNT'L & CaMP. L. REv. 1 (1991) . .As described be-
low, the position of the United States Government, on the other hand, bordered 
somewhere between skepticism and opposition. "The Jury is Still Out" walked a 
middle gyound, attempting objectively and thoroughly to analyze both the benefits 
and costs associated with establishing an international criminal court ("ICC:>), and 
thereby to sharpen the issues and progress the debate. 
3 Supplemental Statement of Senator Arlen Specter for the Congressional 
Record Regarding the Need for an International Criminal Court 5 (October 27, 
1990), cited in Scharf, supra note 2 at 143. 
4 See Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary of State for Legisla-
tive Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Dan Quayle, President of the Senate, and 
Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Oct. 2, 1991); UNITED 
STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, STATEMENT BY THE HONOR.A-BLE EDWIN D. 
VVILLIA111SON, UNITED STATES SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL 
.f\.s.sEMBLY m THE SIXTH COJ\.ffiiiTrEE, USUN Press Release #113-(92) (1992) (hereaf-
ter STATEii-IENT BY EnwrN D. WILLL'\..\JSON). 
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Nations enumerated the many problems that required atten-
tion, they quite purposely were silent as to any possible solu-
tions. In this way, they furthered the goal of State and Justice 
DeparTule.o.t officials who desired to stall international progress 
on the issue. Reading between the lines, the attitude of the U.S. 
Government reflected residual mistrust of international tribu-
nals5 as well as a general concern that the establishment of an 
ICC would undermine the Government's existing international 
law enforcement efforts and authorities. 6 
Notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Senators Specter 
and Dodd (and especially Charles Bataglia and Matthew Hirsch 
of their respective staffs), as well as Congressmen Leach and 
Kastenmeier, the issue of an ICC never received serious consid-
eration by top officials in the Bush Administration. Nor has the 
issue found its way on to Bill Clinton's list of priorities for the 
United Nations.7 Consequently, despite supportive statements 
about an ICC made during the confirmation hearings of the 
newly appointed Secretary of State, Department of State Legal 
Adviser, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Or-
ganizations Affairs in the Spring of 1993, the Government's po-
5 This mistrust stemmed in part from the adverse ruling in the Case Con-
cerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392 (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility 
of the Application). The Decision resulted in the United States' withdrawal from 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. See Statement by the Legal Ad-
viser, Abraham D. Sofaer, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (December 
4, 1985), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. T!m.mLE, lNTERNATIONAL LAw 
1991 (In explaining the Government's decision to withdraw from the World Court's 
jurisdiction, Sofaer stated: "[The ICJ] betrayed a predisposition to find that it had 
jurisdiction and that Nicaragua's claims were justiciable, regardless of the over-
whelming legal case to the contrary."). 
6 See e.g., the United States' controversial authority to apprehend interna-
tional criminals abroad without host country consent in .United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (Holding that United States' courts could try per· 
sons ld.dnapped by United States' agents from Mexico without Mexico's consent). 
For differing views on Alvarez-Machain, see Malvina Halberstam, Agora: Interna-
tional Kidnapping, 86 AM. J. lNT'L L. 736, 746 (1992) and Louis Henkin, Carre· 
spondence, 87 AM. J. lNT'L L. 100 (1993). 
7 The World Federalist Association sponsored a nation-wide letter writing 
campaign urging President Clinton to endorse the establishment of an ICC during 
his Sept. 27, 1993, address to the General Assembly. Notwithstanding this effort, 
President Clinton did not mention the establishment of an ICC as one of the 
United State's priorities for the United Nations. For a text of President Clinton's 
remarks, see Clinton: UN Must Adapt to Different World, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MoN-
ITOR (September 29, 1993) at 19. 
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sition did not dramatically change when the Clinton team came 
on board.8 
During the summer of 1993, however, the convergence of 
various factors began to dislodge the United States Government 
from its earlier position. Senators Specter and Dodd kept up 
the pressure by holding hearings and introducing legislation 
which would put the United States Congress on record in sup-
port of the concept of an ICC and call on the Administration to 
support efforts of the United Nations to conclude an interna-
tional agreement for the establishment of an ICC.9 At the same 
time, the attack on lJI~ peacekeeping trooPs directed by Somali 
warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid suggested an entirely new 
need for an ICC. In response to the attack, the Security Council 
passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General ''to 
arrest and detain for prosecution, trial and punishment" those 
responsible for the attack.10 But the resolution was largely sym-
bolic since in the absence of an ICC there exists no UN forum in 
which to bring such perpetrators to justice. Similarly, despite 
two years of Security Council sanctions, the United States and 
United Kingdom were no closer to convincing Libya to surren-
der the two Libyan officials allegedly behind the bombing of Pan 
Am Flight 103. Libya continued to insist on their trial only 
before a neutral international tribunal. In the absence of an 
ICC, the United States was unable to call Libya's bluff. 
The most important factor of all was the establishment of 
the international tribunal for Yugoslavia. Unable to act effec-
tively to halt Serbian aggression in Bosnia, and faced with 
mounting political pressure to respond constructively to contin-
uing reports of widespread atrocities, the United States Govern-
ment decided to direct its energies to establishing an ad hoc 
international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
B See U.S. Department of State, "Comments of the United States on the Re-
port of the Working Group of the International Law Commission on the Question 
of an International Criminal Jurisdiction," (May 1, 1993) (hereafter U.S. Depart-
ment of State). 
9 See Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, supra at note 2. 
to S.C. Res. 837, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 at para. 5, (1993). 
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the territory of the former Yugoslavia.11 To this end, in less 
than four weeks time, the State Department's Office of Legal 
Adviser, working with several other agencies, developed a pro-
____ ...] -J..-.L_J.._ ~-- .L.L- ~T-----1--...!- m.....!'L----1 --'L!-1... .L.l...- TT_!J..-..l pu::=;t::u OloCl.loULt:: ~U.l l.lllt:: ~ U~U1::iH1V1C1 .LJ.UJUlli:11 VVlll.I,;H Ltllt:: U.U.U,t::U 
States provided to the UN.12 
Most of the United States' proposals found their way into 
the Statute for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal that was 
approved by the Security Council on May 25, 1993. Having suc-
cessfully, and quickly, tackled most of the same complex legal 
and practical issues that it had identified as obstacles to a per-
manent ICC, the United States Government was left with little 
basis to justify continued delay with regard to the ICC. 
Meanwhile, due in no small part to the contributions of 
Robert Rosenstock,'" the ILC had made surprising progress in 
formulating realistic and workable proposals for an ICC. At the 
time my earlier article on this issue was published, the ILC was 
considering whether an ICC should have exclusive (compulsory) 
jurisdiction over a wide range of international crimes, many of 
which the United States did not recognize (such as economic ag-
gression and colonial domination).14 The United States found 
this approach anathema to its interests. 
The 1992 Report of the ILC's International Criminal Court 
Working Group greatly refined the ILC's earlier concept for an 
ICC.15 The Working Group reco=ended that an ICC be a 
"flexible and supplementary facility" for State parties to its 
statute and that the ICC not have exclusive jurisdiction.16 As 
n See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., at 2 (1993) (Deciding to estab· 
!ish Tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/25626 (1993) (Approving Statute for the 
Tribunal). For a detailed discussion, see James C. O'Brien, The International Tri-
bunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 
87 AM. J. l.Nr'L L. 639-59 (1993). 
12 Later, the United States submitted a seventy-six page proposal for the Tri-
bunal's Rules of Evidence and Procedure, with commentary. See submission ac-
companying Letter from Michael Klosson, Charge d'Affaires, United States 
Embassy at the Hague to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali (November 
18, 1993). 
13 See generally the comments of Mr. Rosenstock on the creation of an ICC at 
6 PACE lNr'L L. REV. 
14 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990). 
15 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Fourth Session, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992). 
16 Id. at 14-5. 
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so envisioned, the purpose of the ICC would be to provide a 
third alternative to States Clli""Tently faced only with the choice 
to prosecute or extradite international crinlinals found within 
their territory. Parties to the Court's statute would select from 
a list of international offenses those for which they would be 
bound to provide assistance to the Cou..rt. An ICC would not be 
a full-time body, but rather an established structure (a paper 
court) which could be called into operation when required. In 
its May 1993 Report to the United Nations, the United States 
aclmowledged that "the basic approach advocated in the [1992 
ILC V.Jorking Group Report] ... stril-:::es a ptoper and re~listic 
balance between the many competing i<""J.terests at stake."17 
Dming the 1992 session of the UN General .A..ssembly, the 
United States found itself isolated in its position that more 
study was needed before the ILC should begin drafting a stat-
ute for an ICC.l8 On November 25, 1992, the United States re-
luctantly joined consensus on a UN General .A..ssembly 
resolution that requested the ILC to undertal~:e "the elaboration 
of a draft statute for ar"l. international criminal court as a matter 
of priorit-y as from its next session."19 The United States did 
manage to slow down the process, however, by insisting on the 
insertion of a clause in the resolution requiring the ILC to sub-
mit a "progress report," rather than a completed statute, to the 
1993 session of the General Assembly. 
Notwithstanding this clause, the ILC submitted a compre-
hensive draft statute to the General Assembly for consideration 
at its 1993 session. The ILC's draft statute was based in large 
part on the statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal that had recently 
been approved by the Securit-y Council. By the ti1ne the ILC's 
proposed statute came up for discussion in the United Nations 
Sixth (Legal) Committee in October 1993, the Clinton Adminis-
tration had decided to take a more supportive approach to the 
creation of an ICC and to become actively involved in the effort 
to resolve the remaining obstacles. Thus, in J:>js speech before 
the Su:th Co=ittee on October 27, State Department Legal 
Adviser Conrad Ha.rper stated: 
17 See U.S. Department of State, supra note 8 at 2. 
18 See STATEMENT BY EDWIN D. WILLI.A.M:SDN, supra note 4. 
19 G.A. Res. 47/33 of November 25, 1992. 
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My government has decided to take a fresh look at the establish-
ment of [an international criminal] court. We recognize that in 
certain instances egregious violations of international Jaw may go 
nnpnni~hed be~-B.n...:e of a laek ~Jf ~n effe~tive rratiorr~l fD:rtlm for 
prosecution. We also recognize that, although there are certain 
advantages to the establishment of ad hoc tribunals, this process 
is time consuming and may thus diminish the ability to act 
promptly in investigating and prosecuting such offenses. In gen-
eral, although the underlying issues must be appropriately re-
solved, the concept of an international criminal court is an 
important one, and one in which we have a significant and posi-
tive interest. This is a serious and important effort which should 
be continued, and we intend to be actively and constructively 
involved. 20 
Though somewhat qualified, Harper's remarks constituted the 
announcement of a major U.S. policy and strategy reversal on 
the issue of an ICC. The importance of Harper's announcement 
cannot be overstated. Without active U.S. support, there is lit-
tle chance for establishing an effective ICC. 
III. ANALYsrs OF THE ILC's DRAFT STATUTE 
By borrowing liberally from the Statute of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal, the ILC came up with what State Department Legal 
Adviser Conrad Harper characterized as a "thoughtful and seri-
ous" draft.21 As written, however, the draft statute contains 
several serious problems, which are discussed below.22 
A. Structure of the Court 
Pursuant to Article 5 of the draft statute, the ICC would 
have three organs: a Trial Court, a Registry (administrative of-
fice), and a Proctp"acy (office of prosecutor). As written the draft 
2o UNITED STATES MissioN TO THE UNITED NATIONs, STATEMENT BY THE HaN. 
GRABLE CoNRAD K HARPER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL ADVIsoR TO THE UNITED NA-
TIONS GENERAL AssEMBLY IN THE SIXTH CoMMITI'EE, USUN Press Release #171-
(93) (1993) (hereafter STATEMENT BY CoNRAD K HARPER). 
21 Id. at 1. 
22 Some of the analysis that follows will be elaborated upon in greater detail 
in an upcoming Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on An Interna-
tional Criminal Court, which the author helped prepare. That Report will provide 
a lengthy line-by-line analysis of the ILC's draft statute for an ICC. In contrast, 
the following comments focus only on the most important areas in which the draft 
statute should be revised. 
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statute does not establish a separate office of Defense Counsel , 
although defendants, under Article 44, would have the right to 
court-appointed counsel. It is important that the ICC have an 
independent Office of Defense Counsel to ensure adequate rep-
resentation of the accused and promote institutional balance. 
The Office of Defense Counsel could develop an expertise simi-
lar to that of the Procuracy, and would also enhance the adver-
sarial nature of the Court. Both the Procuracy and Office of 
Defense Counsel would be able to monitor their counterpart's 
interaction with the Court and further ensure that the proceed-
ings will be i..--npa...-rtial.23 If ~TJ. Offir.P. of D~fense Counsel is es~ 
tablished as proposed, the staff of the Registry should be 
divided into three separate staffs for the Procuracy, the Office of 
Defense Counsel, and for the Court. 
In addition, in contrast to the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tri-
bunal, the draft statute does not provide the ICC with a sepa-
rate appellate chamber. Rather, the appeals chamber 
envisaged in Articles 55 and 56 of the draft statute would be 
composed of seven trial judges who did not take part in the trial 
of the defendant. It is a fundamental principle of U.S jurispru-
dence that judges of the same rank should not review each 
other's decisions. This principle is also codified in the Intema-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights24, which provides 
that "everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his 
conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal ac-
cording to law."25 This principle reflects the concem that judges 
normally serving in a trial capacity have inherent difficulty 
overruling decisions by judges with whom they normally would 
serve as colleagues. Consequently, the statute should be re-
vised to provide for the creation of a separate appeals chamber 
in addition to a separate office of Defense Counsel. 
23 See ABA Report on the International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes 
Committed in the Fonner Yugoslavia (1993) at 19 for an elaboration of the justifi-
cations for an Office of Defense Counsel. 
24 G.A Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. AJ 
6316 (1967). 
25 Id. at Art. 14.5 (emphasis added). 
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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The basic approach to the Court's subject matter jurisdic-
h ......... ,. ........... + .... .: ........... ..:J ..... ...:+1...: ...... A-+.-: .... 1 ..... C1'1 ..... ./!' +1.. ..... TT f"l .l--A ..... J- ..... ..1-..-.L- .! ..... 
VI.V~ VV.U.t.~'OU. YV~ll~ ~ld-'-'J.C &.1.&.1 UJ. I.J.Ll!W" ~.l..JV \.Ua..LL i::ILi;l.I.JUI.Jt;:: ~1:1 
sound. The Court wouJd have jurisdiction over those crimes 
covered by intemational conventions that are widely accepted 
by States representing all of the world's major legal systems 
and that have an extradite or prosecute obligation. While most 
of the offenses listed are unlikely to engender much criticism26, 
the inclusion of "apartheid" to the list seems inappropriate con-
sidering how far South Africa has come in dismantling the ves-
tiges of that heinous practice. In addition, the list does not 
include torture and nuclear terrorism as those crimes are de-
fined in the Torture Convention27 and the Convention on the 
Protection of Nuclear Materials.28 This is an unfortunate Oinis-
sion, and shouJd be corrected. 
26 Such offenses include: genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions, aircraft hijacking, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, attacks against interna-
tionally protected persons, and maritime terrorism. See Geneva Convention on the 
Prevention and Ptmishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (signed 
December 9, 1948; entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (Signed December 16, 1970; 
entered into force Oct. 14, 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 
177 (Signed September 23, 1971; entered into force Jan. 26, 1973); International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 341146, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th 
Sess., Supp. No. 46 at lj45, U.N. Doc. N341146 (1979), (Signed December 17, 1979; 
entered into force June 4, 1983), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979); Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1015 
U.N.T.S. 243 (Signed December 14, 1973; entered into force Feb. 20, 1977); Con-
vention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988). 
27 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 
51, U.N. Doc. N39/51 (1985). 
28 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, done at Vienna 
on Oct. 26, 1979, entered into force on Feb. 8, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080. President 
Clinton used his first major foreign policy address on September 27, 1993, at the 
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In addition, the ILC should reconsider whether major drug 
c1imes, as defined in the UN Convention Against illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs29 should be added to the list (especially if Ar-
ticle 26 is deleted as proposed below). It is true that clrug traf-
ficking is of an entirely different order from the other 
international crimes listed in Article 22; however, one of the 
major needs cited for an ICC has been the inability of Carib-
bean, Central.American, and Latin American countries to pros-
ecute major clrug traffickers. 30 
Article 21 of the draft statute provides for a review confer-
ence to examine the operation of the ICC's statute. The confer-
ence also considers possible ad.rlitions to the li::st of crimes for 
which the ICC has subject matter jurisdiction i..rtcluding, "in 
particular, the addition to that list of the Code of Crimes 
agaii1St the Peace and Security of Mankind." The Draft Code of 
Crimes is like a bad penny that continues to turn up in relation 
to the ICC. Many States and commentators have strongly ob-
jected to the Code of Crimes.31 As they have pointed out, the 
Code is redundant with existing international conventions and 
would be disruptive of these conventions where the Code devi-
ates from existing statements of the law. Moreover, it fails to 
specifY the state of mind necessary to be charged with a crimi-
nal violation and neglects to define offenses with sufficient pre-
cision to inform people of what acts will be considered 
criminal.32 Consequently, the reference to the Code of Crimes 
should be deleted from .Article 21. 
Article 26 of the draft statute would give the ICC additional 
subject matter jurisdiction over other crimes "under general in-
ternational law" and "under national law which give effect to 
provisions of a multilateral treaty," provided that the State on 
United Nations General Assembly, to urge international cooperation to meet the 
gro\\'ing threat of "nuclear terrorism". See Clinton supra note 7. 
29 Signed on December 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15, reprinted in 27 
I.L.M. 403. 
:Jo See Scharf, supra note 2 at 152-3. 
31 SeeM. CHERrF BASsroum, CorvtMENTARIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw CoM~ 
J\.rrssroN"s 1991 DRAFr CoDE oF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SEcURITY oF MAN~ 
KIND (1993). 
32 See generally, Connally v. General Canst. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The 
U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal statute is void (as a constitutional law 
matter) when it is so vague and imprecise that "[m]en of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." !d. at 391. 
1 
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whose territory the suspect is present and the State where the 
offense occurred gives their consent. This is perhaps the most 
problematic provision of the entire statute. It would potentially 
" .Ll Tr"'r1 • • .1• , • ,,,... , ,. .. ,.... giVe t..Ile H ..... v J U.t1BwcLiun over uncoillilea, open-enaea onenses 
that are not defined with sufficient specificity and precision to 
inform people of what acts will be considered criminal. In addi-
tion, it would give the ICC jurisdiction over offenses listed in 
regional conventions and intemational conventions that the 
United States and other countries have chosen not to ratifY be-
cause of objections to their subject matter. This Article should 
be omitted altogether from the Statute. 
The draft statute treats the crime of aggression as a special 
case. Under Article 27, the ICC would have jurisdiction over 
the offense of aggression if the Security Council has found that 
the suspect's State has been guilty of aggression. The crime of 
aggression is not defined in any intemational convention. The 
only officially adopted definition of aggression is that contained 
in General Assembly Resolution 3314 adopted in 1974. The his-
tory ofthat Resolution illustrates that it was intended only as a 
political guide and not a binding definition. Article 27 should 
also be omitted from the Statute. 
C. Personal Jurisdiction 
The issue of personal jurisdiction concerns whether a State 
should consent before the Court can obtain jurisdiction over a 
particular accused and the form of this consent. Under the 
ILC's draft statute, the ICC can prosecute a case if any State 
which had jurisdiction under the relevant treaty to try the ac-
cused consents to the ICC's jurisdiction. For most offenses, this 
would include the State of the perpetrator's nationality, the 
State of the victim's nationality, the State where the offense oc-
curred, and the State where the perpetrator is found. Under 
this formula, the ICC could pursue prosecution even where the 
State with custody of the offender refuses to consent. This for-
mulation departs radically from the sensible approach sketched 
out in the ILC Working Group's 1992 report. If the purpose of 
the court is to give States a third altemative to prosecution or 
extradition of intemational criminals found within their terri-
tory, then the consent of the State with custody of the offender 
should in all cases be required (with the exception of cases insti-
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tuted by the Secur·ity Council under Chapter V!I of the UN 
Char---ter33 as envisaged by .A---'--ticle 25 of the draft statute). This 
consent can either be gene:n.>l or on a case-by-case basis. If that 
State does not consent, it vvould be obligated to either prosecute 
or extradite the offender under the relevant treaty. 
Hnwever, as the .A.r-nerican Bar Association Task Force rec-
ogpized, "few, if any, states would be vvilling to agree to the ju-
risdiction of an -international cri_minal cou_rt vvith the authorit-y 
to try their nationals without their consent."34 The United 
States, for example, would have a strong desire to prevent its 
former officials from being hauled before an ICC for inh~rn:=~­
tionally controversial actions such as the 1986 bombing of 
Libya, the in.vasions of Grenada and Panama, the downing of 
the Iranian .Airbus, and the recent cruise missile attack on 
Baghdad. 
Vi/bile perhaps di..lli_nishing the effectiveness of an ICC, re-
quiring the consent of the State of nationality (at least i.."l. cases 
i.."l.volving officials and former officials) is probably the price to 
be paid for widespread i.."l.temational accepta..11ce. Moreover, the 
negative effect of this consent requirement would be roinimized 
if such consent were not required h! cases instituted by the Se-
curity Cow"l.cil under Article 25 of the draft statute. Thus, for 
example, the Secmit-_y Council could LTlsist that Libya surrender 
to the ICC the two officials allegedly responsible for the bomb-
ing of Pan Am Flight 103 not-withstandi.."l.g the consent provi-
swn. The ILC's proposed statute should be revised to 
i.."l.corporate this approach. 
D. .Applicable Law 
If the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction is limited as recom-
mended above, it would only have to tmn to the relevant inter-
national conventions for the elements of the offenses over which 
it has jurisdiction. Article 28(c) of the draft statute directs the 
court to apply "as a subsidiary somce, any applicable rule of 
national law." Tl..lls is an important provision since the relevant 
conventions do not specif-y such issues as defenses, burden of 
::13 Signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, entered into force on Oct. 24, 
1945; reprinted in 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043. 
:J-t See .AJI1erican Bar Association Task Force on J\...n International Criminal 
Com-t, suprr!. note 2 at 109. 
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proof, and mitigating circumstances. The statute, under Article 
53, also envisages the court referring to national law to deter-
mine the length of a term of imprisonment or the amount of a 
fine to be imposed for a crime, and to specify laws as to pardon, 
parole or co=utation of sentence under Article 67. The draft 
statute does not, however, specify which State's laws are to be 
applied for these purposes. This creates uncertainty and leaves 
the court with too much discretion. The solution would be for 
the statute to specify that the ICC would apply the supplemen-
tallaw of the State ill which the offender was found ( :i.ncluding 
its choice of law rules)- a sort of international version of the 
Erie doctrine found in United States jurisprudence. as 
E. Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
Article 19 of the draft statute provides that the Judges of 
the ICC will promulgate the Court's rules of evidence and proce-
dure. For many States, these rules are likely to be critical to 
the acceptability of an ICC. Under Article 19, the ICC's judges 
have broad discretion to adopt rules that, for example, do not 
fully protect the rights of the accused. In this vein, the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo Tribunals have been subject to criticism for 
their use of ex parte affidavits against the accused at trial. 
Instead, the Parties to the court's statute should assume 
the responsibility for developing rules of evidence and proce-
dure and incorporate them into a protocol that would be 
adopted at the same time as the court's statute. They would by 
no means have to begin the process from scratch. The rules de-
veloped for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal could serve as 
the basis, with appropriate modifications, for the rules for a per-
manent ICC. 
I 
F. Surrender of the Accused 
The draft statute is silent on the issue of whether surren-
der of the accused to the ICC should be deemed "extradition." 
In its 1992 Report, the ILC Working Group suggested the novel 
proposal that surrender of persons to the ICC would not need to 
be considered extradition. As characterized in that Report, this 
35 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Holding that a fed-
eral court in a diversity suit should apply the law of the state in which it sits). 
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would enable the numerous States that have legislation or con-
stitutional prohibitions against the extradition of their nation-
als nevertheless to surrender such persons to the ICC, on the 
theory that the ICC is, in effect, simply an extension of their 
own national courts. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest 
that the courts of such States would accept this theory. More-
over, in "The Jury is Still Out," I explained why such an ar-
rangement would run afoul of 1\_,_-ticle III, Section 1 of the 
United States Constitution36 , which requires that any court ex-
ercising the judicial power of the United States must apply 
Uui.ted States lav;, be established by Coll:gress, and be com-
posed of judges who are assured of life tenure during good be-
havior and who are appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.a7 Consequently, the statute should 
make clear that surrender of the accused to the ICC is an 
extradition. as 
The commentary to Article 63 of the draft statute indicates 
that the ILC would return during its 1994 session to the ques-
tion whether a State party that decided not to surrender an ac-
cused to the ICC should also be allowed as an alternative to 
domestic prosecution to extradite the accused to another State 
for prosecution. If the object of an ICC is to ensure that the 
accused is prosecuted and to give States a third alternative to 
extradition and domestic prosecution, there is no good reason 
why a Party should not be able to choose instead to extradite 
the accused to a third State. When national prosecution is 
available, it has inherent advantages over prosecution before an 
international body. Moreover, preserving the extradition option 
is necessary if the ICC is to complement, rather than compete 
with, prosecution before national tribunals. 
36 U.S. CoNST. art. ill, sec. 1. 
37 See Scharf, supra note 2 at 163~4. 
as Extradition is the surrender by the requested jurisdiction to the requesting 
jurisdiction of an individual accused or convicted of an offense within the authority 
of the latter. It requires the requesting jurisdiction to be competent to try and 
punish the fugitive and to seek his surrender for that purpose. See Michael P. 
Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the In-
quiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. 
!Nr'L L. 257 (1989). 
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G. Legal Assistance 
The draft statute, under Article 23, allows States to desig-
nate from a list those offenses for which they accept th" Conrt's 
jurisdiction. The draft statute nevertheless requires States 
that are Parties to the Court's statute but that have not ac-
cepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the type of of-
fense involved in a particular case, to render various kinds of 
assistance to the Court. For example, under Article 33(2) of the 
draft statute, such States are required to ensure that the ac-
cused is arrested and detained. Article 46 provides that the 
Court has authority to "require any person to give evidence at 
trial," even if that person resides in and is a national of a State 
that has not accepted the ICC's jurisdiction with respect to the 
particular offense. The co=entary to Article 58 provides that 
Parties have a "general obligation to cooperate with and provide 
judicial assistance" to the Court, even in cases over which they 
have not recognized the ICC's jurisdiction. Article 45 requires 
Parties not to try the accused if he/she has been acquitted or 
given a light sentence by the ICC even for offenses over which 
the State has not accepted the Court's jurisdiction. 
It makes little sense for State parties that have not ac-
cepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the particu-
lar crime under investigation or prosecution to be under any 
legal obligation to cooperate with the Court. Nor should those 
States be constrained with regard to their authority to institute 
their own prosecution or to extradite the offender to a third 
State rather than the ICC. Rather, such States should come 
within the terms of Article 59 of the draft statute, which calls 
for the voluntary cooperation of States not Parties to the statute 
"on the basis of comity, a unilateral declaration, an ad hoc ar-
rangement or other agreement with the court." The ouly excep-
tion to this should be for cases initiated by the Security Council, 
as to which all States should be obligated to render assistance 
to the ICC. 
H. Appeals 
Article 55 of the draft statute provides that the Prosecutor 
may appeal the Court's judgment of acquittal by asserting com-
mission of errors of fact that have "occasioned a miscarriage of 
justice." Similarly, Article 57 would allow the Prosecutor to ap-
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ply for a review of judgment upon the discovery of a new fact, 
not lmown at the time of trial, "which could have been a decisive 
factor in reaching the decision." In either case, an appeal by the 
Prosecutor, resulting in a reversal of the judgment of the Trial 
Cou..rt, would necessitate a new trial for the same offense, thus 
violati...1""1g the prohibition against double jeopardy as it is under-
stood and applied in the United States. Thus, the language of 
these articles should be amended to permit only the person con-
victed by the Trial CoUJ.--t to request an appe~ 1 after final judg-
ment or a review proceeding. However, either the defendant or 
the Prosecutor should bP. pP.rmitted to seelj; interlocutory ap-
peals of issues of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The key to setting up a permanent ICC that is both accept-
able and effective is to give the court two different types of juris-
diction. The first type would be consensual; surrendering 
offenders and providing assistance to the coUJ.--t would be com-
pletely voluntary on the part of the Parties to the court's Stat-
ute. Consent could be given either on a case-by-case basis or in 
advance by accepting the court's jurisdiction over certain speci-
fied international offenses. The second type of ju..r:isdiction 
would be triggered by the Security Council acting under Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter. In such cases, coopera-
tion with the ICC would be mandatory, backed up by the 
implicit threat of Security Council imposed sanctions for 
noncompliance. 
I concluded my earlier article on this issue by stressing that 
the United States should "participate in the study and possible 
development of [an international criminal court] so that it can 
in..fluence the structure, procedures, and substance of whatever 
results."39 Having pushed for four years from within the State 
Department for a more forward-leaning policy toward the estab-
lishment of an ICC, it is particularly gratifying that the United 
States Government has finally decided to become "actively and 
constructively involved" in the endeavor.40 Now that the 
United States Executive Branch is getting serious about the es-
39 See Scharf, supra note 2 at 168 . 
.to See STATEMENT BY CoNRAD K HARPER, supra note 20 at 2. 
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tablishment of an ICC, the analysis and proposed revisions sug-
gested above should prove useful both to the United States and 
the members of the International Law Commission as they re-
turn iu Lhe ICC project in the months nhc:1d. 
I 
